








A broom to the head: ‘Cleaning Day’
and the aesthetics of emergence
in Dakar
Branwyn Poleykett
University of Exeter, UK
Abstract
Senegal has a long tradition of the collective management of public space via community cleaning.
Since the explosion of the popular ecology movement Set Setal (meaning clean and be clean in
Wolof) in the early 1990s, ‘set’ or hygienic aesthetics have been central to the construction and
control of urban space and deployed to include and enfold but also expel citizens. In January 2020
the Senegalese President Macky Sall called on the population to join him in ‘Cleaning Days’,
bypassing ‘set’ practices. Cleaning Day was met with a response ranging from indifference to
anger and open conflict. In this article I use Cleaning Day as a lens to analyse the production and
reception of set aesthetics in a time of ‘emergence’. Focusing on the power of subaltern practice
to resist the encroachment of a state in search of meaningful symbols, I challenge the idea that
contemporary urban aesthetics is geared towards the creation of a perceived continuity of inter-
ests organised around an aspiration to a global urban standard.
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In January 2020 the President of Senegal,
Macky Sall, announced a new set of public
policies inspired by the African ‘model’ of
the city of Kigali. To achieve the objectives
of the national ‘zero waste’ campaign, ordi-
nary citizens were invited to participate in
monthly ‘Cleaning Days’ where they would
contribute to cleansing public spaces of rub-
bish. I watched the events of the first
Cleaning Day unfold on television in Dakar.
The appearance of the taciturn Sall, often
mocked for his tendency to appear sullen,
even angry in public, surrounded by a prae-
torian phalanx of supporters, with branded
baseball cap and rubbish bag in hand, was a
gift to comedians who got great comic mile-
age out of mocking the unpopular president.
At the bottom of the screen the news tick-
ered inexorably with the evaluation of the
impact of the President’s new policy.
Cleaning Day had been met by responses
ranging from total indifference to attempts
to interrupt and overtly undermine the pro-
gramme, for example, by blocking access to
landfill sites for the extra trucks and vehicles
hired specially for the occasion. While
Cleaning Days arguably had an agenda that
was not acknowledged as covert harassment
of ‘undesirable’ populations took place
alongside the much-publicised official
events, the programme was swiftly mired in
chaos. As the President pressed on with
Cleaning Days, the resistance became more
overt. On 1 February, for example, a
Cleaning Day in Mbour spilled over into
violence. A video circulating on social media
showed an undignified clash between sup-
porters of Macky Sall and local people, with
the new brooms and rakes supplied to parti-
cipants deployed as weapons. Sharing the
video of the scuffle, Twitter user @waangrin
warned the President that ‘This is what hap-
pens when you politicise Set Setal, you get a
broom to the head!’.1
Set Setal (meaning clean and be clean in
Wolof) refers to a historical event, the explo-
sion of the popular ecology movement in
Dakar in 1988, the year of controversial and
publicly contested elections. The original
event was a galvanising, ambiguous and still
perplexing occurrence. Responding to what
they saw as political corruption young peo-
ple sought to cleanse and reform (remettre en
ordre) political norms (Benga, 2001; Diouf,
1998). At the same time, revolted by their
dirty neighbourhoods and the state’s abdica-
tion of responsibility for the maintenance of
the urban environment, young people began
to voluntarily clean and to paint murals on
city walls targeting their fellow citizen’s
behaviour (Diouf, 1992; Enda, 1990). The
goal of this collective activity was to achieve
set– a state of cleanliness – and, implied by
the processual setal, to maintain the hygienic
status of public space through a mixture of
embellishing urban space until people no
longer wanted to dirty it, visual communica-
tion enjoining citizens to preserve the cleanli-
ness of space and, occasionally, coercion and
violence. Set Setal also led to an ‘aesthetic
revolution’ (McLaughlin, 2001: 154) that
reverberated beyond the original event. This
revolution aimed to reform and rewrite pop-
ular historical memory, using the apparatus
of the city to create pragmatic and accessible
accounts of Senegalese history (Biaya, 2000;
Diouf, 1992, 2003). This also led to a loose
‘school’ of public art that evolved alongside
the political movement and which continues
to influence cultural production in the city
today and shape Dakar’s status as an ‘art
world city’ (Grabski, 2017). In a wider sense
Corresponding author:
Branwyn Poleykett, Wellcome Centre for Cultures & Environments of Health, University of Exeter, Queens Building,
Queens Drive, Exeter EX4 4QJ, UK.
Email: b.poleykett@exeter.ac.uk
2 Urban Studies 00(0)
set aesthetics saturate the everyday in
Dakar, they offer the imaginative resources
necessary for creating alternative and auton-
omous spaces of experimentation and crea-
tivity, Set urban aesthetics continue to
provide a resource for urban citizens navi-
gating and interpreting the city (Diouf and
Fredericks, 2016). Beyond the original event
Set Setal endures as applied sanitary tactic,
political practice and idiom of democratic
hygiene. While Set Setal has never estab-
lished a monopoly over popular narratives
of the city and, indeed, waned in popularity
when the movement was seen to be under-
mining the trash workers union (Fredericks,
2018), set images and practices have none-
theless formed the basis for the popular
articulation and appropriation of a wide
range of visions of national development
futures: communitarian, popularist, techno-
political and spiritual.
At the beginning of 2020 people in Dakar
were angered by the apparent lack of respect
for the cultural, linguistic and practical heri-
tage of Set Setal and the spurious invention,
in a foreign language, of ‘Cleaning Day’,
bypassing the intense cultural significance
that collective cleaning holds for Senegalese.
‘Cleaning day’ not only erased the networks
of official and unofficial labour that oversaw
the handling and processing of rubbish
(Fredericks, 2013), it transformed cleanliness
into a ‘slogan’ when it should be ‘everyone’s
business’.2 Dematerialising, decontextualis-
ing, evacuating cleanliness and cleansing of
its complex constellation of meanings, the
miscalculated citation of set-work left Sall
and party activists who went into neighbour-
hoods under the auspices of Cleaning Day
highly vulnerable to attack. The application
of a ‘broom to the head’ seemed to be an
assertion of the popular power to construct
the meaning of public space. One young acti-
vist I spoke to, Mamadou, who used his blog
to disseminate his writing on politics, con-
duct and the public sphere, protested that
‘Cleaning Day’ was a farce, but a revealing
farce. Its symbolic incoherence and its lack
of meaning painfully exposed latent tensions
and long-simmering conflicts over the nature
of urban public space and public tenancy.
For Mamadou, Cleaning Day was a contest
not only over the ownership but also the
character (paternité) of the public: ‘on clean-
ing day there was only him and his support-
ers, the problem is Senegalese always want
to be behind such and such an idea in order
to claim that they invented it, it’s yet another
example of how the authorities refuse to
share public space with the people’.
The erasure of Senegal’s complex history
of public cleaning may have been unusually
crass but it was not out of the ordinary.
Reinvention and rupture with anterior prac-
tices and attitudes has dominated Senegalese
politics for the past 20 years. From 2000 to
2012 President Wade used spending on gla-
morous and charismatic infrastructure proj-
ects to create an ‘alluring if implausible
vision of future possibility marked by
wealth, abundance and global connectivity’
(Melly, 2016: 43). As the gap between spend-
ing and symbolic investment in these proj-
ects and the maintenance of everyday
infrastructures relied upon by urban citizens
widened, these projects came to reinforce a
sense of ‘unbelonging’ (Ghertner, 2015) and
to signal that ordinary people were excluded
from the imagined future of the city. Since
Sall came to power in 2012, Senegal has
adopted a policy of emergence, a series of
strategies designed to accelerate the coun-
try’s journey towards attaining the status of
middle-income economy. While several West
African countries are pursuing projects of
emergence, Macky Sall has, since the launch
in 2014 of the Plan Sénégal Émergent, been
so identified with the policy that Dimé and
Ba (2016) describe him as the ‘apostle’ of
emergence. Achieving emergence has meant
decisively reorienting the state towards the
project of growing the economy, in
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particular via investment and deregulation
of special economic zones, including the new
city of Diamniadio, located on the outskirts
of Dakar (Mansoor et al., 2018). Most
Senegalese will not experience these zones
directly, instead encountering them via the
circulation of authorised images.
As emergence supplants development and
the aspirations, aesthetics and social prac-
tices that underpinned development in the
popular imaginary, the question becomes
how Senegalese can insert and inscribe their
own desires within policies and trajectories
of emergence and how, in turn, the state can
materialise ‘growth’ within the poor urban
communities peripheral to the emerging
economy and build consent for a highly
abstract set of policies. It is within this
highly charged context, I argue, that we need
to locate violent clashes between local set
practices and the disembedded and opportu-
nistic ‘Cleaning Day’. The broom to the
head that Macky Sall supporters received in
Mbour also offers a means of obliquely
approaching Asher Ghertner’s account of
‘rule by aesthetics’. Rather than margina-
lised people being enrolled into a ‘commu-
nity of sense’ and encouraged to partake in
an urban aesthetics defined by the state
according to certain loose and consensual
categories in construction (Ghertner, 2015),
the state here encroaches on a pre-existing
set of aesthetic commitments and political
practice. These insurgent urban aesthetics
pre-date the current regime’s commitment to
a reshaping of the urban around a politics of
‘emergence’, indeed, they have passed
through prior visions of development and
have been shaped by their encounters with
each in turn. I argue that the reception and
construction of Senegal’s politics of ‘emer-
gence’ continues to be structured by older
aesthetic regimes, many of which retain
paradoxical commitments to maximise lati-
tude and freedom within expressive and
enunciatory projects while espousing aspira-
tions for authoritarian government.
To make this argument I draw upon
18 months of ethnographic research on the
production of urban aesthetics through set
practices and what I call set theory, an
embedded way of navigating the city, stabi-
lising and mitigating the city’s pluralities
and ambiguities, and communicating with
fellow citizens. In following set theorists of
various kinds through the city, I encoun-
tered multiple forms of creative production.
I began with artists working in the Set Setal
tradition of public art but, as the category of
set productivity appeared more and more
capacious in practice, the research expanded
to include a range of online activity and
research with bloggers. This was partly in
response to an explosion of interest during
my research in how social media might
expand visibility and increase the punitive
reach of surveillance, and contribute to the
transformation of the city and the govern-
ance of unsanitary behaviours: ‘this is sur-
veillance in real time’ was how one blogger
described to me the unique affordances of
social media for policing fellow citizens’ uses
of public space. Indeed, depending on class
position and location in the city, blogs and
social media were often the primary ways
through which people encounter and partici-
pate in the construction of a collective set
aesthetic. In this way, social media has
greatly facilitated middle-class participation
in set aesthetics, while at the same time
many of the forms of hygienic life that
depend on solidarity and co-presence have
been curtailed.
I begin by describing in detail the role of
Set Setal in the life of one young Senegalese
man: Alioune, a migrant to Dakar from
Ziguinchor. I begin with this biographical
account because it illustrates the centrality
of set practice not just to the construction of
urban space but to the personal identities
4 Urban Studies 00(0)
and trajectories of the people who seek a place
in the city. Alioune’s story differs significantly
from what I describe as Set Setal’s canonical
accounts, and in the middle section of the
paper I consider how some of the ‘original’ set
images were spliced into a canon, reflecting
the interests and interpretations of intermedi-
ary organisations. This prurient interest in set
work and a resulting critical narrative that
stressed its exhausted, recuperated and tamed
character, has left contemporary practitioners
committed to fugitive aesthetic practice that
resists incorporation into a hegemonic urban
form. After considering the production of
knowledge about Set Setal, its ambiguity and
capacity for attaching itself to a range of polit-
ical movements and ideologies, I return to
‘Cleaning Day’ and examine what the instruc-
tive failure of this sanitary spectacle can tell us
about urban aesthetics in a time of ‘emer-
gence’ and ultimately the prospective success
or failure of emergence itself in capturing ima-
ginations and conjuring tangible futures.
Travelling through Set Setal
Despite critiques that Sall was ‘politicising’
Set Setal, set ideas and practices have
been at the heart of political life in Senegal
for 30 years. As Rosalind Frederick’s work
on waste work, labour and Set Setal has
shown, the processing of rubbish has always
been a highly politicised and scrutinised
activity (Fredericks, 2014, 2018). It is inco-
herent, therefore, to describe these domains
as being co-opted into political formations:
Set Setal is already a highly politicised form.
Many Senegalese, however, do think of Set
Setal as potentially and ideally existing out-
side of bureaucratic politics and formal
political life and, as I explore further below,
Senegal has a long history of critiquing the
opportunism of politicians who try to yoke
their messages to set practices. In order to
understand how Set Setal resonates with
individuals and comes to play a significant
role in how they construct their biographies,
I first consider the experience of a young
migrant to Dakar. I met Alioune in the
shaded courtyard of an artistic workshop
during the annual Partcours art festival in
Dakar. I began talking to him because of
the simple and striking image on his hand-
printed t-shirt: two brooms clenched in
raised fists above the slogan Seetal Set. The
semantic play with Set Setal was suggested
to Alioune by his artistic mentor, the vener-
able and visionary Senegalese artist Issa
Samb, also known as Joe Ouakam, who died
in 2017. Samb suggested that Set Setal
should be inverted to make a new slogan,
Setal Set, Set Fagaru, modifying the mean-
ing from ‘clean until it is clean’, to ‘make
clean and be the prevention’. Alioune
explained that fagaru, to prevent in its
reflexive form, indicates societal transforma-
tion. Clean subjects embody, radiate and
model good behaviour that others can then
mimic (topatoo). The question of cleanliness,
Alioune warned me, was rey – huge –
indeed, limitless (du jeex); overlapping with
every form of social, spiritual and political
life imaginable. The cleanliness of people
shaped their capacities in every sense, physi-
cal, moral and intellectual, but also crucially
their creative and expressive potential.
When we first met, Alioune was a student
in the agronomy department at Cheikh Anta
Diop University in Dakar. He had arrived in
Dakar 2 years previously from the southern
city of Ziguinchor. It was his prior familiar-
ity with the practice of Set Setal that had
prepared him for navigating Dakar’s distinc-
tive spiritual and cultural identities and
interpreting and unlocking the city, helping
him to integrate into a city that can be
unforgiving for an unnetworked migrant.
Growing up in Ziguinchor, a city without its
own Set Setal tradition and far away from
the cultural reference points of Wolof his-
tory and Mouride Islam that visually and
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intellectually coordinated the philosophy
and aesthetic of Set Setal, Alioune and his
peers improvised. Indeed, Alioune explained,
they began ‘doing’ Set Setal without know-
ing it, they were organising the cleaning of
their communities before a group of young
men in the neighbourhood on their summer
break from their studies in Dakar began to
instruct them on the spiritual and collectivist
dimensions of Set Setal. These ideas were
not wholly new to Alioune. From the educa-
tion he had received at home he knew of the
importance of personal cleanliness and
through his religious education he had been
taught that it was impossible to acquire
knowledge in a state of uncleanliness.
However, the encounter between the young
people in Ziguinchor and the Dakar cadres
was transformative. These young men
sought to transmit some of the knowledge of
spiritual, social and public life they had
encountered in their adoptive Dakar neigh-
bourhoods. For example, they explained
that before a public cleansing, it was neces-
sary to cleanse yourself until you had a
‘clean heart’ and a ‘clean conduct’. They
impressed upon the young Casamancais par-
ticipants that a true Set Setal was not only
about cleansing the environment. Indeed, if
it was just cleaning, the significance of the
act was quite distinct and separate from the
significance of Set Setal.
For young people, creating meaning from
the obdurate materials of the city was part
of the ‘struggle’ on which the city’s associa-
tional life was founded; how to reconcile
one’s own spiritual reflection and matura-
tion with existing forms of collective prac-
tice? For Alioune, the social role of the artist
was deeply important, combining practical,
tutelary and mystical functions. He
described being an artist as being ‘like a
teacher, the president, a member of parlia-
ment, and an intellectual all at once’. In his
provincial Set Setal practice, however,
Alioune did not focus on creating art and
diffusing it to visually naı̈ve publics. Instead,
in Alioune’s account, the Ziguinchor move-
ment capitalised on a deep local belief in art
(gëm nanu art). Rather than rigid or didactic
forms of instruction or static pieces of com-
munication, the Set Setal movement in
Ziguinchor incorporated urban détourne-
ment into the hygienic aesthetic and designed
agile and subversive interventions into urban
space. For example, they hung fictive or pla-
ceholder traffic lights at busy and unsuper-
vised intersections, drawing attention to the
absence of basic infrastructures. For
Alioune and his associates, singular and
striking interventions were the answer to the
key political and aesthetic question of Set
Setal: how to prolong peoples’ wondering
and credulous engagements with enchanted
infrastructures and translate that into dur-
able and lasting behaviours? The forgetting,
laxity, the punctures and rupturing of atten-
tion; the backsliding and undoing of practice
preoccupied Set Setal artists. Alioune
repeated what I heard many times, that for-
getfulness was the defining characteristic of
urban dwellers, who must be responsive to
modernity’s ruptures, to its sutures and
jump cuts and to the fundamental unpredict-
abilities it induced in daily life, and be capa-
ble of prolonging practice throughout these
vagaries and across these interruptions. The
message of Set Setal, Alioune told me, was
not revolutionary. Rather, through Set Setal
young people uncovered forms of rigour and
obedience that had been second nature to
their parents and grandparents, habits and
rhythms and ways of relating to one another
that had been forgotten. For Alioune, then,
Set Setal was a project of renewal through
return, recovering values guided by religious
principles: practicing cleanliness, demon-
strating humility before hierarchy and mani-
festing mutual respect. Through these
practices, young men growing up buffeted
by crises of social reproduction, masculinity
and meaning attempted to become les gars
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stables through the surest way available, by
following the religious guides. Alioune chose
this path of respect because those guides ‘do
everything for us, they sacrifice themselves
for us, it is only correct that in return we fol-
low them’. Alioune gently corrected my
interpretation of the Seetal Set image he
wore on his t-shirt. Where I had read a
clenched fist grasping a broom and inter-
preted this as a transnational image of mili-
tancy, he intended to evoke a more modest
ethos of solidarity. Return, recovery, repair,
continuous practice, aesthetic and material
victories over the ephemeral: in a context of
ephemerality, insecurity and flux, what
could be more revolutionary?
Set work: Aesthetics,
interpretation and the city
I have shared Alioune’s story because I
think it illustrates the multiplicity of the pol-
itics of Set Setal, drawing attention to the
fact that the ‘politicisation’ of set practice
does not have a predictable or linear trajec-
tory towards mobilisation or political identi-
fication. Alioune’s experience shows how an
aesthetic consciousness saturates under-
standings of political life. Of the many set
narratives that I collected from people with
a range of socioeconomic backgrounds, the
unifying narrative was that although set
practices might guide conduct and, eventu-
ally, regulate public life, the most important
element of it was self-fashioning: turning
oneself into an exemplar through careful,
imitative practice and the structured initia-
tion into responsible urban life. The ques-
tion of what political, economic and social
programme these behaviours and habits
might translate into was less clear and Set
Setal could be enrolled in a range of political
movements. The capacity of Set Setal to
serve a wide range of ideologies was part of
its intrinsic heterogeneity, its openness and a
large part of its durable appeal.
Because of its enduring association with
youth, set aesthetics, tactics and strategies con-
tinuously (re)emerge at the heart of youth-led,
counter hegemonic projects (Ba, 2016). For
example, when the Y’En a Marre movement
arose against President Abdoudlaye Wade
with the intimate pedagogic and political goal
of creating a Nouveau Type de Sénégalais, Set
Setal was at the heart of a project concerned
with revolution and renewal. One member of
the movement described the embeddedness of
Set Setal in the movement’s political practice
in the following terms: ‘to do Set Setal is to
rid ourselves of this colonial heritage, that reg-
ulates our way of being, of conceptualising
things’ (Nelson, 2014). The Nouveau Type de
Sénégalais is an agile attempt to capture ideals
of renewal, recreation and reproduction for a
project of citizenship with counter hegemonic
intentions. The project was certainly not
immune to critique and recuperation, pedago-
gic projects skirt the irreligious in their inti-
mate remakings of public and private lives. At
the very least, the project can be critiqued for
its ostentation, its lack of humility. At a public
meeting in Pikine for a new political party a
local politician criticised ‘undisciplined’ young
people of the Y’en a Marremovement for their
‘spectacularisation’ of citizenship. For him
and many other Senegalese like him, he
claimed, citizenship was an ordinary quality of
the everyday. The example he reached for to
illustrate the perfect join of humility and the
public, was Set Setal. Through his invocation
of Set Setal, its cultural appropriateness, its
humility and its religiosity, he called for a
‘return’ to values of respect that were sadly
lacking in today’s politics. In this case it was
explicitly framed as the prescription for a
youth-led form of boisterous politics that drew
too much attention to itself, placing individual
perceptions above those of the collective and
the civic. Just as the political practices that Set
Setal has stimulated and encompassed over
the past 40 years have been plural, the open-
ness of the practice and the movement seems
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to lend itself to being cited as part of many dif-
ferent kinds of political and social pro-
grammes, and many different kinds of
urbanism, even ones that are contentious or
explicitly opposed.
Although Set Setal does rub up against
formal politics, it is also embedded in set
work and set theory, everyday practice in
the relation to the city. The broader historio-
graphy of Set Setal shows that whatever
began in 1988 it was multiple and contested
from the start. Even in accounts from the
time, the fervour and excitement seem tinged
with ambivalence. Even as the paint was dry-
ing on the first murals in Medina, Colobane
and Guediawaye, the meaning of the event
seemed to be migrating into a curated world
of abstraction, valorisation and theorisation.
Set Setal was the subject of multiple and
intersecting gazes. Not just what Azoulay
(2012) calls the ‘practical’ gaze; but idealis-
ing, curatorial and colonial lines of sight col-
lided in Dakar in the early 1990s. As such
the original movement is often seen to have
been co-opted or ‘recuperated’ (Biaya,
2000), its original creative resources churned
back into a hierarchical and institutional
vision. It is clear, then, that the dynamic and
multiple meaning-making of Set Setal is
built on an edifice of citation, reproduction
and co-optation. Why, then, was Cleaning
Day and the sight of President Sall with bin
liners and rubber gloves a twist too far in
this dynamic, cyclical process through which
set values are renegotiated and remade?
Set values: Distributed authority
and the exercise of ‘civility’
Before I ever really saw a Set Setal I had
managed my expectations by reading a stack
of crit on the movement’s co-optation and
redundancy, and by listening to my more
middle-class friends who assured me that it
was no longer possible to participate in a
‘real’ Set Setal. Witnessing my first Set Setal
was still a deflating experience. It was diffi-
cult to connect some of the narratives I had
collected about the social and spiritual con-
notations of set practice in the everyday to
the branded busy-work of people in tabards
cramming rubbish into bin bags. I suspected
that perhaps the more oneiric, inchoate and
inventive parts of set practice had been hived
off and existed in the now hygienically sepa-
rate genealogy of art-practice, where, as art
historians have shown, artists preserve sig-
nificant continuities between original set
practice and their everyday (Leduc-Gueye,
2016; Rabine, 2014). Perhaps it was true that
the movement had only really gathered up
popular and practical energies for a brief
moment. What also became more tangible
witnessing a ‘real’ Set Setal, a physical event
of collective cleaning, was the potential of
the practice to exclude, alienate and critique,
the persistent and lacerating critique of oth-
ers who ‘just watched’, or lounged by the
side of the road encouraging or teasing more
responsible and community-minded citizens.
Where Set Setal challenged the state’s claim
to paternité, the paternalistic claim of the
right to legally, socially and symbolically
define public space, set practices do not
always claim that space on behalf of every-
one. In flipping urban public as audience
they may construct masses as receptive to
their didactic messages, but claims to the
right to the city are not always universal.
As much as Set Setal represents new
forms of coming together, new formations
and alliances, the critique that Set Setal
directs towards the state can equally connect
to other targets. As Diouf (1992) made clear
in his original and foundational analysis of
Set Setal this urge to differentiate publics
and expel those who appear to threaten the
cleanliness of the collective is in the DNA of
the movement. From the very beginning and
throughout, Set Setal has engaged in violent
practices of vigilantism and censure (Diouf,
2013). Set Setal events were uncertain,
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kinetic and open ended. The movement was
associated with outbursts of punitive vio-
lence against women who practiced xeesal
or skin lightening and against sex workers.
In other words, the movement has always
oscillated between contesting and reinfor-
cing the imposition of bourgeois and urbane
bodily norms in the name of civility, between
countering a singular and hegemonic vision
of the city as clean and pure, and attempting
to expand cleanliness and purity to make
them states that can be accessed by the poor.
While the politics and aesthetics of Set Setal
reach towards the excessive and sublime, on
a local and specific level the practice can
drift into banal ‘acts of aesthetic ordering’,
such as those described by Jessica Winegar
in Egypt in the aftermath of the revolution.
These acts, Winegar (2016: 610) argues,
‘powerfully reveal the contradictions and
class contours at the heart of utopian
visions’. In the 1990s Set Setal evolved
alongside an austere and hierarchical dis-
course of ‘civility’ as a counterpoint to disor-
der that dominated public life during the
presidency of Abdou Diouf. Participating in
Set Setal was not just a way of interrupting
claims on space, it could also demonstrate
fitness to occupy space. When President Sall
appeared in his cleaning gear in 2020 he was
even accused of ‘playing Diouf’, meaning
that he was embodying a kind of paternalis-
tic political role familiar to Senegalese from
the 1990s. Set Setal is after all a movement
based on the re-making of the self, of carry-
ing over values of rectitude developed in pri-
vate and translating them into acts of public
self-assertion, via a tactic of forming a col-
lective corps. It is hardly surprising that the
elite in the 1990s, highly concerned about
political unrest and protest, sought to frame
these questions as intergenerational conflict,
claiming that civility was a key Senegalese
cultural value that had been lost along the
way through a lapse into laxisme and
indiscipline.
Set politics have long articulated with
and intertwined with cognate and adjacent
visions of cleanliness rooted in a bourgeois
and gentrifying vision of a socially cleansed
polis. These politics can be interpreted as
attempts to capture the symbolic privileges
of the upper classes on the part of the work-
ing class, recently urbanised illiterate and
otherwise ‘symbolically naı̈ve’, people who
might have been accused of lacking fluency
in dominant languages and capacities to
‘read’ the city. Set politics create a place
within national development for productive
and civil bodies, labouring to bring together
a healthy future and in doing so they often
inadvertently relieved the state of certain key
functions (Fredericks, 2018). Policies of
emergence, based on a rupture with pre-
existing models of economic, social and cul-
tural development, threaten development’s
vernacular aesthetic regimes with obsoles-
cence, questioning the very place of citizens
within the production of the nation’s future.
From what I have shown so far of Set Setal
it is apparent why the state might want to
displace the movement or sap some of its
power. Set Setal functions as a kind of por-
tal through which the past can continually
reassert itself through creative citation and
lateral leaps of association. Little wonder
that the state might seek a novel political
idiom through which to express appropriate-
ness and cleanliness and through which to
construct the future.
Citizenship in a time of
emergence: Rule by aesthetics?
I have considered the accusation of ‘co-opta-
tion’ levelled at Sall and why his citation of
set-work and identification of his own politi-
cal campaigns with public cleansing gener-
ated a popular backlash in Dakar. The other
context for the Cleaning Day debacle is the
development and promotion of Senegal’s
social and economic programme of
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‘emergence’. In 2014 the government of
Senegal introduced the Plan Sénégal
Émergent (Ministère de l’Economie, des
Finances et du Plan, 2016). These pro-
grammes are designed to increase annual per
capita growth, which has hovered around
0.5% for the past 30 years, to between 4%
and 5% in a short period of time.
Emergence is first and foremost a post-devel-
opment discourse (Dimé and Ba, 2016), it is
a way of capturing the future outside of a
more incremental vocabulary of develop-
ment, a lexicon that is seen as exhausted and
cynical. Relatively disinvested from pre-
existing developments, goals, thresholds and
indices, emergence seeks to generate a self-
evident transformation and improvement.
Setting aside an evaluation of the wisdom of
the economic and social policies, there are
clear advantages for political leaders who
draw on the language of emergence. The
sheer novelty of the semantic possibilities of
emergence compels. Emergence offers a new
vocabulary of state intervention, it is based
on an immanent potentiality. Tactics of
emergence (investment in zoned areas and
investment in household resilience through
social protection programmes) constitute a
break with broad schemes of improvement
that see swathes of terrain and portions of
public and social life as potentially suscepti-
ble to improvement (Li, 2007). Even gram-
matically, emergence functions differently
from development, it is more difficult, for
example, to conjugate emergence, a proces-
sual phenomenon, in relation to specific sub-
jects. For the remainder of this paper I
suggest certain ways that we might put some
ethnographic flesh on the bones of Dimé and
Ba’s description of emergence as succeeding
and supplanting development. Emergence is
not just an economic policy, it imposes
changes in the vocabularies and practices
that have organised urban political life in
Dakar across the 20th century. How is
emergence configured within the enunciatory
apparatus, the symbolic image-world, and
the structures of political mobilisation and
organisation that constitute Set Setal? And
how might this violent conflict over the pub-
lic register of futurity and possibility result in
collisions between brooms and heads in
Mbour?
The Senegalese government has made a
concerted effort to anchor the inchoate and
unfamiliar term ‘emergence’ in the
Senegalese imaginary. They have done this,
for example, by associating it with large
infrastructure projects such as the autoroute
de l’emergence and the cité de l’emergence,
attempting to associate ‘emergence’ with
desirable social goods in the present (Dimé
and Ba, 2016). Alongside the building of
these charismatic, globally standard infra-
structures, public events are organised
‘under the sign of emergence’, opening up
‘emergence’ to vulgarisation but also to a
‘folklorisation’ (Dimé and Ba, 2016: 4, my
translation), the translation of emergence
within local idioms and expectations. This
possibility of ‘folklorising’ infrastructures
and infrastructure-led visions of future
development such as emergence connects to
ethnographic and historical accounts of the
charisma of infrastructure and the capacity
of these projects to stimulate affective
attachments on the part of the poor, who do
not need to believe that they will necessarily
be included in the vision they encode or even
to believe in their eventual realisation to be
captivated by their aesthetic power. The
mere existence of this heterotopia and the
force of the imaginative act that it took to
bring this space into being, even virtually,
can in certain places catalyse a ‘shared
dream’ of what the city should be like, and
an aesthetic consensus that supports that
dream, even as the right to the city frag-
ments and contracts (De Boeck, 2011;
Ghertner, 2015; Harms, 2012; Melly, 2013).
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These claims are particularly pronounced in
De Boeck’s (2011) work on Kinshasa. Here
I want to unpick one strand of de Boeck’s
work on the negative aspects of urban ima-
ginaries – their capacity to create spaces of
shared affective investment without redistri-
bution – and develop it conceptually and
empirically by placing it within the field of
meaning and cultural production I have
already identified set crit or intellectual pro-
duction on Set Setal. Through his account
of urbanism in Kinshasa, de Boeck shows
that the urban imagination is not necessarily
a popular and positive repository of ideas
for living. In fact, de Boeck and others break
with a narrative of cultural production as an
urban resource that, I have argued, has
roots in the curatorial fascination, academic
reception and general explosion of crit on
Set/Setal. The urban imagination is instead
here a terrain where the poor and margina-
lised can partake in a dominant aesthetic
strategy, based on the invention of a ‘new
space that escapes from the real order of
things’ (De Boeck, 2011: 278), without bene-
fiting from the material goods or prosperity
generated by these new infrastructures.
‘Civility before emergence’: The
enclosure of the imaginary
An obvious but important point to make
about emergence is that even if proponents
and architects of emergence-oriented politics
do attempt to occupy the symbolic ground
of Set Setal, that occupancy will not be suffi-
cient to shut down the imaginative and crea-
tive energies of Senegalese, or to stop them
using an idiom of cleanliness to express and
contest the right to the city. One obvious
way in which people are already doing this is
by satirising emergence through linguistic
play with its lexical field and its acoustic
association. So the P.S.E., the Plan Sénégal
Emergent, becomes in times of disruption to
electricity and water supplies the Plan Sans
Electricité or the Plan Sans Eau. Equally, on
social media people exploited recent images
of urban populations responding to floods, a
frequent occurrence that the government has
not managed to develop an effective political
and infrastructural response to, with com-
ments on how this was an image of Senegal
‘emerging’, not metaphorically from poverty
into a prosperous future but literally out of
dirty floodwaters. In other words, the lin-
guistic and visual creation cannot be con-
tained and as fast the state generates new
authorised symbols, satire and pushback
rushes in.
The set imaginary remains open, the ter-
rain of creativity, reinvention and contesta-
tion across the physical space of the city and
the virtual spaces of social media where set
theory surfaces. However, as I thought about
the set theorists, bloggers, political activists
and artists I spoke to, I remembered how
often they stressed that the difficulty was
translating this huge mass of words into more
concrete actions. The blogger Mamadou told
me that it was only Set Setal that had suc-
ceeded in coupling creation with action, or
verbal and imaginative agility with acts of
civility. In so doing, Set Setal had punctured
the tendency that these young men attributed
to Senegalese: lassitude, incivility and an
unwillingness to pass from words to action.
What set-workers of all kinds had to do now,
according to Mamadou, was to make every
citizen conscious of the unique and powerful
role that they had to play in transforming the
country. This assertion, however, becomes
complex in a time when the regulation and
planning of public space revolves around poli-
cies of emergence. As a ‘jumpstart’ policy
articulated in elite spaces and elite language
and territorialised in special and separate
zones, emergence creates a rupture not just
with anterior economic and social policy, but
with the vernacular and popular enactment of
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those policies in local government, on com-
munity level and through associational life. In
essence, where Senegalese have in the past
been enjoined to participate and build the
nation’s future via acts of civic engagement
and by the eradication of those habits and
mentalities that ostensibly constitute a ‘brake’
on the nation’s development, emergence
demands little explicit reciprocal social action
and organisation from its citizens. If it is the
responsibility of the state to grow the nation’s
economy there is no meaningful way in which
the dispositions, habits and attitudes of
Senegalese can facilitate or obstruct the pre-
paration of national space for the seeding of
foreign capital. For many years, via
authorised government communication and
via set communication, ordinary Senegalese
received the idea that the success or failure of
development depended on their capacities and
their hard work, and they broadcast that mes-
sage to each other, using whatever was at
their disposal. That is not to say that set prac-
tice would not have a place within an emer-
ging Senegal. One vision and interpretation of
emergence might be that citizens should stay
in their neighbourhoods, pursue strategies of
self-reliance rooted in the esprit de corps culti-
vated by Set Setal, deploy the goods distribu-
ted to them via new social protection schemes
responsibly and wait, patiently, for emer-
gence. Examining the archive of Set Setal and
the range of ways it is practiced and imagined
in the contemporary city, I think it is clear
that the vision of Set Setal contained within
this possible future trajectory of emergence
would be classified as ‘just cleaning’, that is to
say, voluntarism without solidarity, busywork
without its spiritual, social, communal and
popular significance.
One way that people sought to counter
this view of the future was to place emer-
gence within older and more familiar voca-
bularies of self-fashioning, bourgeois
rectitude and citizen participation. In
particular a set of ideas emerged here
around the slogan ‘civility before emer-
gence’. It is hard to remember where I first
encountered the phrase ‘civilité avant émer-
gence’ but as my fieldwork developed I
heard it again and again, and not just heard
it but saw it, as the phrase began to appear
on walls, part of the undertow of constant,
contrapuntal annotation of public space, the
use of walls to express the pensée collective
that has long been practiced in Dakar
(Benga, 2016). The idea that older values of
civility should chronologically precede emer-
gence for which Senegalese would be other-
wise unprepared, was taken up and repeated
in online spaces. Writing for the site Dakar-
Actu, for example, Mame Abdoulaye
Tounkara underlines the limits that indisci-
pline places on tempos and trajectories of
national development and also of
emergence:
Can we really aspire to emergence without let-
ting go of this very Senegalese disease, this
notorious INDISCIPLINE. Let’s dare to say
it loud and clear! We will never get out of the
pit of underdevelopment unless we stop soft
soaping the real issues. Our strong taste for
trickery, for the violation of clearly established
rules, our tendency to believe that we ourselves
are smarter than everyone else, up to the point
of using shortcuts, whatever the cost, just to
satisfy our own needs, all of these behaviours
are pushing us backwards. Last but not least,
the masla this constant laissez allez, always
punctuated with a ‘grawoul’ [it doesn’t matter],
the catchphrase of mediocre people, another
cause of our delayed development.3
The history of Set Setal is one of constant
innovation and creativity as new media and
technological possibilities, new visual codes
and languages, and changes in the landscape
of official and authorised political discourse
are churned through set aesthetics and
theorised using set interpretative materials.
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The satirical play with ‘emergence’ ties into
the ludic and rebellious nature of Set Setal,
while the tendency to rewrite emergence’s
temporalities and to place it within a linear
and incremental trajectory dependent upon
the ‘civility’ of ordinary Senegalese repre-
sents another strand. As in John Manton’s
account of Nigerian ‘environmental akalism’
which, through its will to change and cleanse
the urban environment, constitutes itself as
a ‘viable and potent political philosophy’ in
the face of continuing and unresolved mate-
rial and infrastructural challenges (Manton,
2013), Set politics has long laundered struc-
tural issues as personal responsibility and
individual identity. As people begin to apply
set theory to ‘emergence’ and to chip away
at its high sheen facxade, it can feel as if
Senegalese are trapped in a repetition in
which values of civility and the power to cre-
ate and define the meaning of public space
and the norms of governance are claimed by
the state, reclaimed by citizens, arrogated,
appropriated, cited, fought over and con-
tested, while the material organisation and
status of the urban space continues to fall
short of the expectations of those who seek
to transform it. The political gambit of
emergence in Senegal appears to be not only
to accelerate growth but to cleanse political
discourse and practice of idioms of civility
and participation, discourses into which
people can easily project themselves, and to
avoid the unbordered, unbridled potentiality
of a Set Setal. In this context of symbolic
enclosure and erasure it is easy to see why
Sall’s citation of Set Setal caused extreme
offence.
Like Set Setal, Cleaning Day also implied
not just carnivals of communal cleaning but
also violent practice of harassment and
social cleansing. In Pikine a largely informal
suburb of Dakar, I walked with my friend
Moussa through the Grand Niaye, a piece of
protected ecology in the heart of the over-
crowded city and a space of urban
agricultural production. In the field I take
care not to indulge or to express my own
bourgeois bodily values and impulses to
value cleanliness, light and space, and order.
I have learned that my Senegalese friends
can define spaces as set even when to me
they look ‘dirty’. Nonetheless I was dis-
mayed at the mass of tenancy that had
rushed in to occupy the space and the resi-
dence it had become for marginalised peo-
ple, rough sleepers, addicts and the mentally
ill. Moussa commented that the space had
become more unruly since the police had
taken advantage of Cleaning Day to ‘clear
out’ (déguerpi) the sides of the motorway,
shaking down informal sellers that clustered
around the road and people living in impro-
vised habitations. Like the majority of peo-
ple I spoke to, Moussa broadly approved of
the more coercive policies enacted under the
sign of Cleaning Day, repeating the argu-
ment I heard again and again in Dakar that
unlike in Europe ‘where public space is more
normed and more regulated than private
space’, Senegalese will always need authori-
tarian approaches to encourage them to use
private space ‘correctly’. Moussa’s response
was not unusual, it was the symbolic violence
of the state’s appropriation of cleaning as a
localised and meaningful activity not the
banal physical violence and harassment of
vulnerable and marginalised urban citizens
that was generally perceived as offensive.
Conclusion: A broom to the head
Across the countries most associated with
the policy – Senegal, Burkina Faso, Côte
d’Ivoire and Cameroon – a conceptual and
theoretical literature is being written on
emergence, its popular and cultural dimen-
sions and how it can be rooted in African
cultural dispositions and political forma-
tions (Péclard et al., 2020). Often cited is the
Cameroonian economist Daniel Etounga-
Manguelle and his observation that a
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country ‘cannot emerge by decree’,4 popular
ownership of the idea is necessary for true
transformation. An inculcation of beha-
viours and a change of mentalités is certainly
important, although where it is discussed in
the technical literature on emergence it often
refers to the creation of cultures of meritoc-
racy, competition and achievement, and the
cultivation of a sense of esteem and parity
with other states (Kouakou and Zongo,
2017). The intense, internal and local, even
parochial nature of Set Setal might from this
perspective disqualify the movement from
potentially adding cultural heft and ballast to
policies of emergence in Senegal. The two
examples that I have given of responses to
emergence are signals of the new forms of
public life that are appearing in response to
discourses of emergence. Whether those
responses are satirical, creating distance
between the population and emergence by
mocking its pretensions, or covetous, attempt-
ing to re-frame emergence around citizenship
and civility, the meaning of emergence will
not stay in the hands of the government.
I have considered the turns that Set Setal
has taken, emphasising its flexibility, its resi-
lience, its ability to incorporate critique of
new hegemonic forms into its distinctive aes-
thetic world. I have also shown how set the-
ory orientates a wide range of everyday
practice and political identification, forming
the building blocks of the personal identities
of urban citizens. The movement itself is
riven with internal contradictions and vul-
nerable to co-optation, and, perhaps because
of this, people who associate themselves with
Set Setal tend to react violently to the mis-
appropriation of set labour and aesthetics.
However, my explanation for why this par-
ticular Cleaning Day descended into vio-
lence does not just rest on an understanding
of the complex history of Set Setal. At stake
is the question of whether people in Dakar
can integrate the incremental, participatory
and communitarian ethos that Set Setal has
brought to urban development in Senegal
into a new programme of growth-oriented,
economic and infrastructural reform.
Cleaning day represents a clash between a
deeply rooted vernacular aesthetic repertoire
and a future orientation that encapsulates
‘unbelonging’ through an interpellation of
the public to participate in an active quies-
cence, to practice self-reliance in the inter-
regnum between the present and emergence.
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Tiers Monde.
Fredericks R (2013) Disorderly Dakar: The cul-
tural politics of household waste in Senegal’s
capital city. The Journal of Modern African
Studies 51(3): 435–458.
Fredericks R (2014) Vital infrastructures of trash
in Dakar. Comparative Studies of South Asia,
Africa and the Middle East 34(3): 532–548.
Fredericks R (2018) Garbage Citizenship: Vital
Infrastructures of Labor in Dakar, Senegal.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ghertner A (2015) Rule by Aesthetics: World-
Class City Making in Delhi. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Grabski J (2017) Art World City: The Creative
Economy of Artists and Urban Life in Dakar.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Harms E (2012) Beauty as control in the new Sai-
gon: Eviction, new urban zones, and atomized
dissent in a Southeast Asian city. American
Ethnologist 39(4): 735–750.
Kouakou P and Zongo T (2017) Modernisation de
l’Etat et changement de comportements. In:
Kaba N, Cissé B, Diagne I, et al. (eds) L’Afrique
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